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Several Asian economies have accumulated large stocks of
international reserves over the last few years. This motivates the
question we address in this paper from an empirical point of view. Are
these large increases in reserves an efficient crisis-prevention strategy?
Or are they second-best to other options, such as improving governance
and developing better institutions in the financial markets? The current
literature does not reach a firm consensus. A number of studies argue
that reserve accumulation reduces the likelihood of self-fulfilling
speculative attacks.1 Others, however, stress that reserve accumulation
is a relatively costly self-insurance strategy. Moreover, reserve
accumulation could also be a counterproductive strategy, while crises
are likely to be deeper in the presence of weak financial systems.2
In this paper, we estimate a model to quantify the impact of
international liquidity on the probability of a crisis. Our goal is to evaluate
how robust reserves (or the lack thereof) are in explaining crises, in
particular, after we control for the quality of political institutions and
the soundness of the financial system. We then use our estimates to
evaluate the optimal level of reserves from a cost-benefit analysis for a
group of East Asian economies and for Chile.3
We thank David Rappoport for efficient research assistance and Michael Dooley,
Fernando Broner, Sebastián Edwards, Jaewoo Lee, Romain Ranciere, and Olivier
Jeanne for comments.
1. See, for example, Sachs, Tornell and Velasco (1996); Chang and Velasco
(1999); Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001).
2. These points are noted particularly in Caballero and Krishnamurthy (1999,
(2000, 2001).
3. Recent research on related topics can be found in Aizenman and Lee (2005).
External Vulnerability and Preventive Policies, edited by Ricardo Caballero, César
Calderón, and Luis Felipe Céspedes, Santiago, Chile. © 2006 Central Bank of Chile.
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Our results lead us to the conclusion that recent trends in reserve
accumulation by some Asian economies seem a sensible approach to
dealing with the current macroeconomic conditions in the world
economy. The empirical evidence we present indicates that the
probability of crisis is still strongly related to the ratio of reserves to
short-term debt, even when we control for political and financial system
variables. At the same time, the actual size of the reserve stock
observed today is not far from what would be implied by the usual
cost of a crisis.
Our work is framed around two existing strands of the literature
on international reserves. The first strand is the role of reserves as
an indicator for financial or currency crisis in the context of the
early-warning-system literature.4 Typically in this literature, an
exchange market pressure variable is constructed combining increases
in interest rates, the exchange rate, and rapid reserve depletion. This
variable attempts to summarize the magnitude of speculative behavior
over a wide range of possible policy responses and regimes, and it is
therefore not restricted to specific circumstances, such as depreciations
after periods of fixed exchange rates. An indicator variable is created
that takes the value of one if exchange market pressure is above a
specified crisis threshold. The second step in this procedure is to regress
this indicator on a set of right-hand-side variables, which typically
include the ratio of reserves to short-term debt and the misalignment
of the real exchange rate. This framework should thus allow an observer
of these variables to assess the likelihood of a currency crisis.
Although we follow the logic of this basic approach in our work, we
extend the empirical methodology in two directions. First, we include
different variables to capture the effect of financial depth on the likelihood
of a crisis. We test whether a deeper, more liquid domestic financial
system is related to a lower probability of crisis. Second, we include
governance variables. Weak political institutions are prone to deal feebly
with financial stress, as they do not have the correct incentives (because
of corruption), they lack technical expertise, or their policy actions are
not credible to market participants. Our results indicate that the effect
of the ratio of reserves to short-term debt on crisis probability is robust
to the inclusion of these two sets of variables, and the selected financial
and political variables have an empirically ambiguous or weak relation
with the probability of a crisis.
4. See Frankel and Rose (1996); Berg and Pattillo (1999); Sachs, Tornell, and
Velasco (1996); Berg and others (1999). See also Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999).
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The second strand of the literature on which we base our work is
the standard model of reserves demand. We use a simple model that
relates the optimal level of reserves to its opportunity cost and the
expected cost of a crisis. By assuming reasonable values for the latter,
we compute theoretical optimal levels for reserves and compare them
to actual recent stocks held by a number of Asian countries and Chile.
We find that for a crisis cost of between 5 and 15 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP), the actual ratio of reserves to short-term
debt in some of these Asian countries is below the optimal level derived
from the model. At the same time, the implicit cost of a crisis that is
consistent with the actual level of reserves held by those countries is
in the range of a soft to mild crisis. These results, however, turn out
to be very sensitive to the data used and the specification of the model
for the crisis probability.
Our approach to explain reserve accumulation emphasizes the
role of international liquidity as a tool for self-insuring against
external shocks. Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber (2003, 2004)
put forward an alternative explanation for the large reserve
accumulation by East Asian economies. According to these authors,
this large reserve accumulation—in particular, by China—
corresponds, in part, to an export-oriented development strategy, by
which governments attempt to systematically keep the real exchange
rate undervalued by accumulating reserves. We do not explore this
hypothesis in this paper.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes some
recent trends in reserve accumulation by emerging economies. Section
two then presents the empirical methodology used to estimate the
probability of a crisis and discusses the main results. Section three
computes the optimal level of reserves for a selected group of Asian
countries and for Chile. Finally, section four concludes.
1. RECENT TRENDS IN RESERVE ACCUMULATION
One of the most remarkable features of the recent trend in reserves is
the large accumulation by East Asian economies. By the end of 2003, four
East Asian economies (namely, China, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand)
held roughly 25 percent of world’s total international reserves. These
countries have systematically increased their reserve holdings over the
last several years. Measured as a percentage of GDP, reserves in these
four East Asian economies on average grew from roughly 10 percent at the
end of the 1980s to nearly 30 percent in 2002. Reserves have increased not
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only relative to the size of those economies, but also relative to short-term
external debt: the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt rose from
2.5, on average, for those four countries in 1990 to 5 by 2002.
These figures are heavily influenced by the trend followed by reserves
in China, which increased from less than 10 percent of GDP in 1990 to
more than 25 percent of GDP in 2002, and to a lesser extent by the trend
in Korea and Thailand (see figure 1). Korea held a relatively constant
fraction of GDP in reserves (about 5 percent) until the Asian crisis. After
1998, it dramatically increased its reserve holdings to 25 percent of GDP
in 2002. Thailand systematically increased its reserves as a fraction of
GDP throughout the 1990s. However, this country also received large
capital inflows over these years—until the Asian crisis—so its ratio of
reserves to short-term external debt actually felt from 1990 to 1998.
After that year, reserves increased systematically, measured both as a
fraction of GDP and relative to short-term external debt .
Figure 1. Reserves in four East Asian economies, 1990–2002
China Korea
Malaysia Thailand
Source: Authors’ calculation based on IFS/BIS data.
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Malaysia held a relative large stockpile of reserves in the 1990s,
measured both as a fraction of GDP (30 percent on average) and relative
to short-term external debt (more than twice its stock of short-term
external debt, on average). Both ratios fell before the Asian crisis but
have grown since.
East Asian economies are not the only countries to have accumulated
large amounts of international liquidity. Emerging market economies,
in general, have followed a similar pattern, though to a lesser extent
(figure 2). Reserves in emerging market economies grew from
approximately 5 percent of GDP at the end of the 1980s to 16 percent in
2002 (figure 3).5 When measured with respect to short-term external
liabilities, reserves in emerging market economies also increased
systematically after the early 1990s, despite the large capital inflows to
those economies during this period. The ratio of reserves to short-term
debt in emerging market economies rose, on average, from approximately
1 in 1990 to 2.4 in 2002 (see figure 4).
Figure 2. Real Reserves in Emerging Market Economies
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFS data.
5. In contrast, developed economies have maintained a relatively constant
ratio of reserves to GDP of about 6 percent since the mid-1980s.
171-206 A IMPRIMIR.pmd 02/03/2006, 10:51 175Figure 3. Reserves in Emerging Market Economies as a
Share of GDP
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFS data.
Figure 4. Reserves in Emerging Market Economies as Ratio
of Short-Term Debt
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IFS/BIS data.
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2. RESERVE ACCUMULATION AND CRISIS PROBABILITY
Recent literature on international crises emphasizes the role of
international reserves in preventing financial or currency crisis.6
Rather than serving as a buffer to absorb transitory current account
shocks—(as was emphasized in the literature on reserve adequacy in
the 1950s and 1960s), reserves are now perceived as a tool for reducing
both the frequency and the impact of international crisis. This role of
international reserves has been widely analyzed, both theoretically
and empirically. However, the quantitative contribution of reserves
to reducing the risk of a crisis has only recently been addressed.
Bussière and Mulder (1999), for example, find that the ratio of short-
term debt to reserves is significant in predicting a crisis. They also
quantify how much liquidity (reserves) countries should have to
counteract weak fundamentals and avoid a crisis. In this section, we
follow the early-warning-system literature to quantitatively estimate
the robustness of the contribution of reserves in reducing the
probability of an international crises.
2.1 Empirical Approach
The literature usually posits a specification that relates the
probability of a crisis to the ratio of reserves to a selected scaling variable
and a number of other controls. Consistent with recent theoretical
emphasis on liquidity to explain crisis, we consider as a scaling variable
the short-term debt of the country.
For the sake of simplicity, we denominate pi,t the probability of a
crisis in country i at time t, and we assume that it is a function of a
linear combination of the ratio of reserves to short-term debt at the
beginning of period t, Ri,t / Si,t, the total debt to GDP ratio, Di,t / Yi,t,











=β + β +γ − ε ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
Z . (1)
In this formulation the ratio of reserves to short-term debt is a measure
of the liquidity of the economy, and the ratio of total debt to GDP is a
proxy for solvency. Therefore, β0 < 0 and β1 > 0.
6. The theoretical literature includes, for example, Calvo (1996), Chang and
Velasco (1999), and Jeanne and Wyplosz (2001).
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We estimate the crisis probability based on a panel of countries
with yearly observations. To define a crisis episode, we use the standard
measure of exchange market pressure (EMP), by constructing a
weighted average of the first differences in the real exchange rate, and






























where RERi,t is the average real exchange rate of country i in year t,
and Ri,t is the level of reserves (real) at the end of year t. Weights
correspond to the inverse of the variance of each variable for all countries
over the full sample. A crisis episode occurs in period t in country i if
EMPi,t exceeds a predetermined threshold value, X . In particular, we











if  EMP >EMP + 2SD EMP
otherwise (3)
In this framework, the crisis probability corresponds to the probability
of the event Yi,t = 1. This probability cannot be measured ex ante, as
only the effective ex post occurrence of crises can be observed. Moreover,
the latter hinges on the particular definition of the threshold value, X .
For the sake of our main argument, we abstract from these considerations
for now, and assume that a well-defined function relates macroeconomic






















⎟ 1 01 ββ γ ε Z . (4)
Equation 4 indicates that the probability of a crisis occurring in
period t is a nonlinear function, F, of a linear combination of the ratio
of reserves to short-term debt and other variables included in vector
Zi,t, such as the deviation of the real exchange rate from its fundamental
or long-run value, GDP growth, and the exchange rate regime.
7. Bussière and Fratzscher (2002) use a similar measure, but they also consider
pressures absorbed by interest rate movements. In our case, we cover a longer
time span, and incorporating interest rate movements would have decreased the
data significantly. Other works that use a similar crisis indicator are Kamin and
Babson (1999) and Kruger, Osakwe, and Page (1998).
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2.2 Quantifying the Effect of Reserves on Crisis
Probability
This subsection presents benchmark estimates of crisis probability.
Estimations were made using a logit model with yearly observations
for the period 1975–2003. These estimates clearly highlight two of the
results found in the literature, despite the lower frequency of our data
and the longer time span. First, a low ratio of reserves to, among other
measures of liabilities, short-term external debt, by the end of a year,
increases the probability of a crisis in the subsequent year. Second, a
large deviation of the real exchange rate from trend in a given year
increases the probability of crisis in the subsequent year. The magnitudes
involved are large.
Tables 1 through 3 present the results of a number of estimates
using three scaling variables for reserves. Tables 1 and 2 present the
results using short-term debt from different sources, while table 3 uses
total external debt.8
Short-term debt is usually chosen as the scaling variable for reserves
in crisis models. In circumstances of financial stress, however, a
liquidation of assets held by investors (both local and foreign) need not
be constrained to their holdings of short-term external debt. Domestic
agents can liquidate their own holdings of money (a central bank
liability), while holders of external debt can attempt to shift their
portfolio away from all external liabilities. This justifies trying other
definitions of the relevant scaling variables for reserves.
8. The data on short-term debt are from the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database.
The main difference between the two sources is that the BIS data include not
only debt with maturity of up to one year, but also amortizations due within the
year. Unfortunately, this database starts in the 1990s and is available only for
emerging economies.
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In tables 1 and 2 the coefficient of reserves to short-term debt is
statistically significant at 10 percent in all specification. In table 3
(using total external debt), half the specifications lead to a statistically
significant estimate for the effect of the ratio of reserves to total debt.
Moreover, the exchange rate deviation from trend is statistically related
to the probability of a crisis in essentially all the specifications in all
three tables.
We expanded these basic estimates with a number of other variables
that are included in the literature. The effect of the inclusion of these
variables, as well as their estimated impact, is discussed in what follows.
The effect of different measures of liabilities
Including as an additional explanatory variable the total stock of
external debt, as a percentage of GDP, does not affect either the size or
significance of the impact of the ratio of reserves to short-term debt and
exchange rate deviations from trend in tables 1 through 3. It also does
not appear to significantly affect the probability of a crisis.
In table 3, the inclusion of the structure of external debt similarly
does not have a significant impact. However, if the ratio of reserves to
total debt is used instead, then the estimated coefficient is an order of
magnitude larger than the coefficient on the ratio of reserves to short-
term debt in previous specifications.
This result must be interpreted with caution, as it is a product of
the scaling of the variables and not a marginal contribution to the
crisis probability. When we also incorporate the structure of external
debt, the ratio of short-term to long-term debt appears to increase the
crisis probability, but not with a statistically significant coefficient.
Economic growth and credit booms
Economic growth, measured as both aggregate GDP growth and
export growth, appears to strongly influence the probability of a crisis
in the expected way. This can stem from a number of causes. A fast
pace of economic growth can reduce the demand for publicly provided
assistance programs and allow for increased tax revenue over the
cycle, while fast export growth, given domestic demand growth,
reduces the current account deficit. Including both export growth
and GDP growth indicates that the latter is the most significantly
related to crisis probability.
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Domestic credit expansion, on the other hand, has a positive impact
on crisis probability. However, it is not statistically significant at
conventional levels.
External conditions
In principle, one should expect that crises would be more likely
whenever external conditions deteriorate. Declining terms of trade,
an increase in international interest rates, and the interaction of the
latter with the outstanding stock of external debt should make for
difficult circumstances.
However, the results from our estimations are mixed. When we
control for the ratio of reserves to short-term debt and for the deviation
of the real exchange rate from trend, the effect of the terms of trade on
crisis probability is far from clear-cut. Several exploratory specifications
(not reported) suggest that a positive terms-of-trade shock—identified
by either the change over previous periods or the deviation from a
Hodrick-Prescott trend–increases the probability of a crisis. Another
striking result is the lack of a statistically significant direct relation
between changes in international interest rates (proxied here by the
U.S. Treasury bill rate) and crisis probability.9
These odd results, if they stand closer scrutiny, could result from
correlations with our main variables that relate to the crisis probability:
the ratio of reserves to short-term debt and the deviations of the exchange
rate from trend. A fall in the terms of trade or an increase in international
interest rates could influence crisis probability through its impact on
reserve policy. Evidence on this front is suggestive.10
The interaction term between international interest rates and the stock
of total external debt (a common measure of the financial burden of external
debt) is statistically related to crisis probability in only one specification.
Exchange rate regime
The stock of reserves is related to the exchange rate regime in a
trivial way. A fixed exchange rate regime should lead to a close relation
between the adjustment of the money market and movements in
9. Results are available in García and Soto (2004).
10. García (1999) finds that, in contrast to the predictions of standard models
of reserve demand, the correlation between reserves and international interest
rates is negative for emerging economies. Exploring regressions that include the
ratio of reserves to short-term debt lead to a positive, but only slightly significant,
effect of the international interest rate on crisis probability.
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reserves, while a floating exchange rate regime should allow reserves
to move more independently of monetary developments. A more
difficult question is whether countries with a particular exchange
rate regime would choose to hoard more or less reserves, on average.
This is linked to is the sensitivity of a particular exchange rate regime
to crises. To assess this latter issue, we include a measure of the
exchange rate regime as an additional regressor in our crisis probability
specifications. We use Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2002) measure of
exchange rate regimes, extrapolated for the period 2000 to 2002. To
prevent the simultaneity problem that would arise from including
the contemporaneous exchange rate regime and the occurrence of a
crisis, we lag the regime variable by two years. The results obtained
are included in tables 1 through 3. We find that the exchange rate
regime is, in fact, related to crisis probability. The results are robust
to a number of different specifications and measures of reserves, and
they show that, compared to the baseline of a hard peg, fixed regimes
are more prone to crisis. Flexible regimes, on the other hand, are not
particularly less prone to crisis, as could be expected.
Hence, our results show that the worst choice, in terms of external
vulnerability, is a weak commitment to a fixed exchange rate. This
result is consistent with the commonly held view that economies have
tended to abandon intermediate regimes for either a full float or a hard
peg (Fischer, 2003).
2.3 Different Measures of Crises
In related literature, an alternative variable often chosen to indicate
the occurrence of a crisis is a large current account reversal. We
estimated similar specifications as those presented above, replacing the
exchange rate market pressure variable with the occurrence of a large
swing in the current account (more than 4 percent). Baseline results
are presented in tables 4 through 6. The scaled reserve variable remains
statistically significant in all cases, while the real exchange rate
misalignment is still strongly related to this crisis measure. The
specifications that include the exchange rate regime variable still have
the same implications for the fixed regimes as the previous results, but
they are statistically significant in only a few cases. However, flexible
exchange rate regimes now seem to reduce the likelihood of crises, though
the coefficients are not statistically significant. One variable that appears
to be strongly related to the current account reversal is a measure of
the openness of the economy.
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2.4 Financial Development, Political Variables, and
Crisis Probability
One of the hypotheses we explore in this paper is that the
probability of a crisis may be affected by institutional aspects. In
particular we are interested in evaluating the impact of financial
market development on crises and the role of political institutions in
determining a country’s vulnerability to external shocks. We expect
that more developed financial systems should allow lessen the need
for reserves to stave off crises. A deeper or better-functioning financial
system should facilitate the funneling of domestic resources to prevent
costly adjustments in the face of crises. At the same time, we expect
that solid political institutions, in the sense that they are transparent
and accountable, reduce the likelihood of crony capitalism, allow
market participants to see economic policy measures as credible,
and are themselves better suited to face financial turbulence promptly
and efficiently.11
The empirical problem with this hypothesis is that it is inherently
difficult to select a particular variable that summarizes the implication
of political institutions for a country’s vulnerability. We draw from
other work and use an index of institutional development, constructed
as the first principal component of four indicators: the prevalence of
law and order, the quality of bureaucracy, the absence of corruption,
and the accountability of public officials.12 We call this the governance
index, and we also use some of the indicators individually.
To analyze the implications of financial development on crisis
probability, we use the database on financial system indicators
presented by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001), from which we select
four indicators. Two are intended to reflect the efficiency of the
financial sector, and two capture the size of the financial market.
With respect to efficiency, we expect that an efficient financial system
reduces the probability of a crisis by increasing the informational
content of price signals and thus allowing the private sector to adjust
smoothly. The variables we selected to measure efficiency are the
net interest margin and the stock market turnover. The net interest
margin is measured as the accounting value of a bank’s net interest
11. Aizenman and Marion (2004) show that the quality of political institutions
may affect the optimal level of reserve holdings.
12. We thank César Calderón for providing us with this dataset. The original
source is Political and Risk Services (PRS) Group, International Country Risk
Guide (various issues).
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revenues as a share of total assets. A lower reliance on this type of
income reflects narrower spreads between lending and borrowing
rates, and it is therefore indicative of a more competitive banking
system. A low net interest margin also implies that the financial
market is characterized by few informational asymmetries or by
heterogeneous agents whose idiosyncratic risk is muted. Meanwhile,
high stock market turnover is indicative of low transaction costs or
a large degree of liquidity in stocks.
With regard to the size of the financial market, a large financial
sector should allow the fiscal or monetary authorities to tap the required
resources to stave off liquidity shocks, instead of having to draw on
international reserves. We selected two variables to capture size: stock
market capitalization and total private credit by banks and similar
institutions.
Tables 7 and 8 summarize the effects of including the financial
system variables and the governance index, both individually and with
an interaction term, in the three benchmark estimates (one for each
scaling variable for reserves). Both financial and political variables
are lagged two years to mitigate simultaneity bias. Panel A in both
tables reports the median of the coefficient of the benchmark variables
and the number of times the respective variable is statistically
significant out of the total number of specifications (in brackets). Panel
B reports the coefficient of each of the institutional variables included
in different specifications (these variables do not enter simultaneously,
except for the interaction term).
The main results highlighted in the previous section still hold.
Economic growth, real exchange rate misalignment, and the ratio of
reserves to the different scaling variables are all statistically related to
the crisis probability. The effect of the financial and political system
variables is much less clear-cut. When included individually, governance
variables (both the aggregate measure and the separate indicators of the
prevalence of law and order and the absence of corruption) are far from
statistically significant. The one exception is corruption, which seems to
increase the crisis probability (see table 7).13
Financial system variables are also far from having a statistically
significant effect on crisis probability when included alone. The exception
here is the net interest margin, which has a negative effect on crisis
probability. Interaction terms only slightly improve the results. The
13. A higher value for the index indicates a better quality of institution, so
higher values for the corruption index indicate lower corruption.
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specifications in columns 2, 5, and 8 of table 7 better fit our hypothesis.
These results indicate that good public institutions, measured by the
governance variable, reduce the probability of a crisis, but this effect
is biggest for economies with small financial systems, as measured
by the amount of private credit or financial capitalization. These last
two variables alone seem to increase the probability of crisis. Finally,
our results show that a large net interest margin increases the
probability of a crisis, but only for high values of the governance
variable, which by itself is negatively, although not significantly,
related to this probability.
The previous specifications attempt to detect whether institutional
variables per se affect crisis probability. An alternative is that
institutional variables are substitutes for reserves in determining the
likelihood of a crisis. If this was the case, the marginal contribution of
the stock of reserves to the crisis probability should depend on the degree
of institutional development. The bottom rows of tables 7 and 8 present
specifications in which the reserves variable is interacted with the
institutional measures. The results are again inconclusive, and only in
a few cases are they statistically significant. These results, and those
reported above, are not clear enough to make a strong case that
institutional variables reduce the likelihood of a crisis once one controls
for reserve accumulation and real exchange rate misalignment. Of
course, good institutions could limit the probability of a crisis indirectly
through the choice of exchange rate regime, as well as reserves and
exchange rate policies.
Political and financial variables thus do not appear to be strongly
related to crisis probabilities in our specifications. The effects are not
always statistically significant, and the signs are often opposite to what
we expected. In contrast, the results of the benchmark estimates hold.
The ratio of short-term debt to several measures of liabilities, the growth
rate, and exchange rate misalignment are all still strong determinants
of crisis probability.
3. AN ASSESSMENT OF RECENT TRENDS IN RESERVE
ACCUMULATION
In the debate on reserve accumulation by East Asian economies,
some analysts argue that while reserves may be a useful tool for avoiding
a crisis, the level of reserves needed to actually prevent a financial
crisis is limited. Specifically, a ratio of reserves to short-term external
debt above one would considerably reduce the crisis vulnerability of a
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country, but a ratio much above one would do nothing to reduce the
risk of a crisis (see, for example, IMF, 2003). While theoretical
arguments can be made to justify such an assertion, no one has
undertaken a systematic quantitative evaluation of the contribution of
reserves to reduce the crisis vulnerability.
In this section, we take our earlier estimates of crisis probability at
face value to evaluate recent trends in reserve accumulation by some
emerging East Asian economies and Chile. Importantly, our model for
crisis probability encompasses nonlinear effects of liquidity measures.
While these nonlinear effects may not be enough to capture a possible
threshold level for the ratio of reserves to short-term debt above which
its marginal contribution to reducing the risk of a crisis is nil, at least
the quantitative magnitude arises from empirical estimates.
We perform two types of exercises. First, we determine the optimal
level of reserves for each country under different assumptions about
the cost of a crisis. Second, we establish the implicit cost of a crisis that
underlies actual holdings of reserves, under the assumption that the
reserve level is optimally determined in each country through a cost-
benefit analysis.14
To determine the optimal level of reserves, we closely follow the
cost-benefit analysis of Ben Bassat and Gottlieb (1992). Consider the
problem of a central bank that decides the amount of reserves it will
carry over period t by minimizing an expected loss function that
considers both the effects of reserve accumulation in terms of reducing
the expected cost of a crisis and the opportunity cost of reserves.15 We
assume the loss function for the authority takes the following form:
() 1 tt t t t t pCp R Λ= + − ρ , (6)
where pt is the probability of a crisis, which depends on the ratio of
reserves to short-term debt and which is given by expression 5 above;
Ct is the cost of a crisis; Rt is the level of reserves; and ρt is the unit cost
14. The optimal or adequate level of reserves for a country is usually
determined either by estimating a reserve demand model (Aizenman and Marion,
2003; Flood and Marion, 2001) or by using simple adequacy indicators (Wijnholds
and Kaptyen, 2001). Lee (2004) develops an alternative options-based approach
to establish the optimal amount of reserves.
15. De Gregorio and Lee (2003) and Park and Lee (2002), among others,
show that real output growth typically follows a V pattern over the period before
and after a crisis. However, the post-crisis growth rate for those countries does
not exceed the precrisis period average, which means that a crisis entails a
permanent output loss.
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of reserves. The authority decides the optimal amount of reserves each
period by minimizing equation 6 subject to
KWRD ttt t −+=, (7)
where Kt is the capital stock of the economy, Wt is total wealth, and
Dt = St + LTDt is the total debt of the country (composed of short-term
debt, St, and medium- and long-term debt, LTDt). We assume that
short-term debt is predetermined, and any change in reserves is financed
with medium- and long-term borrowing. This assumption allows us to
reach an interior solution for the optimal amount of reserves. If reserves
are completely financed with short-term debt, then any change in
reserves conveys a one-to-one change in short-term debt, and the ratio
between these two variables is never modified. This implies that the
authority cannot affect the probability of a crisis by adjusting reserves.
Since carrying reserves is costly and provides no benefit, then the optimal
amount would tend to be zero.
We assume that reserves affect not only the probability of a crisis,
but also the cost of a crisis. Depending on how reserves are used and
whether the crisis originates in a liquidity shock, large amounts of
international reserves could imply that countries avoid costly liquidation
of assets. This, in turn, would reduce the impact of the shock on domestic
output. De Gregorio and Lee (2003), for example, find a statistically
significant effect of liquidity—measured as reserves relative to either
domestic liabilities (M2) or short-term debt—on reducing the cost of a
balance-of-payments crisis.16
In our case, we assume that the cost of a crisis (as a share of GDP)
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16. De Gregorio and Lee (2003) also find that financial soundness, real
exchange rate depreciation, and monetary policy play a critical role in reducing
output losses associated with balance-of-payments crises.
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We have assumed that the opportunity cost of reserves is independent
from the ratio of reserves to short-term debt. In theory, this opportunity
cost corresponds to the difference between the marginal productivity of
capital in the economy and the yield on reserves, which is typically lower
than then productivity of capital. In our empirical application below, we
use the sovereign spread of each country in our sample as a proxy for
this opportunity cost. These sovereign spreads depend on the perceived
risk of each country, and they could therefore be affected by the country’s
international liquidity. However, empirical estimations of the
determinants of sovereign spreads for emerging economies show that
the effect of reserves is negligible and in many cases statistically
insignificant. Some recent empirical studies for emerging markets further
show that short-run movements in spreads are explained by changes in
market conditions rather than fundamentals (Naudon, 2004). Since we
do not consider possible effects of reserves on spreads, our results should
tend to underestimate the optimal level of reserves.
On combining the previous two expressions, we obtain the following
nonlinear equation in Rt:
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corresponds to the change in the cost of a crisis associated with a change
in the ratio of reserves to short-term debt.
3.1 Optimal Level of Reserves for Selected
Economies
We compute the optimal level of reserves derived from equation 9
for four Asian economies (China, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand) and
Chile. As a proxy for the opportunity cost, we use data on sovereign
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spreads from the J.P. Morgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global
(EMBI Global). We use two of our benchmark estimates of crisis
probability from the previous section: one based on BIS data to construct
the ratio of reserves to short-term debt (specification 7 in table 1) and
one that draws on World Bank data (specification 7 in table 2). Finally,
we assume that η = –0.0025, which is the value estimated by De
Gregorio and Lee (2003) for the marginal effect of the ratio of reserves
to short-term debt on the cost of a crisis.
Table 9 presents the estimates of the optimal level of reserves for
three possible crisis costs: 5 percent GDP, 10 percent GDP, and 15
percent GDP. These figures correspond roughly to the costs of a currency
crisis, a currency crash, and a banking crisis, respectively, according
to estimates by the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 1998).17
The results based on the BIS data indicate that the amount of
reserves held by Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand in 2003 is not above
what would be optimal for those countries.18 The amount of reserves
that these countries are countries would be justified even if the cost of
a crisis is low. In fact, for a mild crisis cost, the optimal amount of
reserves could be up to 100 percent higher than what is actually being
held. If we consider the results based on the World Bank data, however,
the amount of reserves held by Korea and Thailand is roughly consistent
with the optimal amount for a mild crisis, whereas Malaysia is holding
a clear excess of reserves.
In the case of China, actual reserves are at least twice the optimal
level according to the BIS estimates, no matter how strong the crisis.
Based on these estimates, the optimal level of reserves in 2003 was
approximately 12.3 percent of GDP if we consider a crisis cost of 15
percent of GDP. This number is 85 percent less than the amount of
reserves that China is currently holding. When we consider the World
Bank estimates, China’s reserves are consistent with a cost of a crisis
that ranges from mild to strong.
In the case of Chile, actual reserves are systematically above the
optimal level. The only exceptions are when the comparison is the optimal
17. According to figures reported by the IMF (1998), the average cost of a
currency crisis, a currency crash, and a banking crisis in emerging markets—in
terms of loss of output relative to trend—is approximately 7.6 percent of GDP, 10.7
percent of GDP, and 14.0 percent of GDP, respectively.
18. The optimal level of reserves for these three countries is not well defined
for the years 2000 and 2001 because the crisis probability in those years is polluted
by the recovery period after the Asian crisis.
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level for the past three years based on BIS data and when the cost of a
crisis is 15 percent of GDP. For a moderate cost (10 percent of GDP),
reserves are between 40 and 100 percent above the optimal level.
3.2 Implicit Cost of a Crisis
An alternative method for evaluating reserves consists in determining
the implicit cost of a crisis that is behind the actual reserve level being
held. Table 10 presents these estimates, under the assumption that the
reserve level is determined optimally according to equation 9.
The implicit cost of a crisis ranges from 2.9 to 6.6 percent GDP in
the case of Korea to 4.9 to 11.6 percent of GDP for Thailand. In other
words, the reserve levels of these two countries is consistent with a
soft to mild crisis. In the case of Malaysia, the implicit cost of a crisis
could be very low if we use the estimates based on BIS data (2.8 percent)
or relatively high if we consider the World Bank data (21.7 percent).
Our conclusion with respect to the adequacy of reserves for this country
is thus mixed.
The cost of a crisis that is implicit in the level of reserves held by
China is extremely high when we consider the estimate based on BIS
data. According to our calculations, the cost of a crisis that would justify
the amount of reserves held would be approximately 150 percent of
GDP, which is clearly larger than any actual crisis. Under the estimates
based on World Bank data, the implicit cost of a crisis is consistent
with a mild crisis (approximately 11 percent of GDP).
To understand why the reserve level held by countries such as
Korea and Thailand do not seem to be above the optimum for those
countries, it is necessary to consider both the cost of holding reserves
and the probability of a crisis. For these two countries, the estimated
probability of a crisis in the last two years was not extremely high
(2.6–5.9 percent in the case of Korea and 2.5–5.0 percent in the case
of Thailand), but it was much larger than the crisis probability of
countries like China (roughly 0–1 percent percent). At the same time,
the cost of carrying reserves for these two economies has been very
low, at around 100 basis points over the last two years. Therefore, the
cost-benefit analysis implicit in equation 9 suggests that the optimal
level of reserves should be relatively high.
The clear excess of reserves in the case of China with the BIS data
stems from the fact that the crisis probability is very low. In fact, the
cost of reserves for China is the lowest of all the countries in our
sample (less than 100 basis points in the last two years). In other
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words, the excess reserves for this country does not result from the
high cost of carrying reserves, but from the low benefits of holding
them. The low spread in the case of China reflects, in part, the low
risk of a crisis for this country.
Finally, the implicit cost of a crisis in the case of Chile corresponds
to the cost of a mild to severe crisis. However, this implicit cost is
much lower that the cost of the Chilean crisis in the early 1980s which
was in the range of approximately 20 to 40 percent of GDP.
4. CONCLUSIONS
A number of studies argue that reserve accumulation allows
countries to reduce the likelihood of self-fulfilling speculative attacks.
Analysts also stress that reserve accumulation is a relatively costly
self-insurance strategy that can actually be counterproductive. Large
stocks of reserves may create moral hazard problems that could weaken
a country’s financial system. This, in turn, could make crises deeper
in those economies.
In this paper, we estimated the impact of reserves on the probability
of a crisis. Our goal was to evaluate how robust reserves (or the lack of
thereof) are in explaining a crisis after we control for set of indicators,
including the quality of political institutions and the soundness of the
financial system. The empirical evidence we presented indicates that
the probability of crisis is still strongly related to the ratio of reserves
to short-term debt even when we control for institutional variables.
We then used our estimates of crisis probabilities to evaluate the
optimal level of reserves from a cost-benefit analysis for a selected group
of East Asian economies and for Chile. This exercise demonstrated that
the actual size of the reserve stock observed today in some of these
countries is not out of line with the usual cost of a crisis. Our results
lead us to the conclusion that recent trends in reserve accumulation by
Asian economies could be a sensible approach to dealing with the current
macroeconomic conditions in the world economy.




REER MIS Lag of real effective exchange rate deviation from Hodrick-Prescott
tendency (IFS)
R/STD Lag of real reserves to real short-term debt (IFS/BIS, IFS/World Bank)
R/TD Lag of real reserves to real total debt (IFS/WB)
STD/TD Lag of short-term debt to total debt
Pub debt Public debt (WB)
Growth Real GDP growth average of lags 1 and 2 (World Bank)
Exports Lag of real exports growth (IFS)
Corrupt Second lag of corruption annual average ICRG(106)
L&O Second of law and order annual average ICRG(113)
Governance Second lag of governance (ICRG)
Capitalization Second lag of stock market capitalization to GDP (DL2001)
Turnover Second lag of stock market turnover to GDP (DL2001)
Credit Second lag of private credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions to GDP (DL2001)
Net int. margin Second lag of net interest margin (DL2001)
Gov*Credit Second lag of interaction between governance and private credit
(ICRG, DL2001)
Gov*Capitalization Second lag of interaction between governance and stock market cap
(ICRG, DL2001)
Gov*Turnover Second lag of interaction between governance and stock market turn
(ICRG, DL2001)
Gov*Net. int. margin Second lag of interaction between governance and net interest margin
(ICRG, DL2001)
RES*Capitalization Second lag of interaction between reserves and private credit (IFS,
DL2001)
RES*Turnover Second lag of interaction between reserves and stock market cap (IFS,
DL2001)
RES*Credit Second lag of interaction between reserves and stock market turn (IFS,
DL2001)
RES*Net. int. margin Second lag of interaction between reserves and net interest margin
(IFS,  DL2001)
RES*Governance Second lag of interaction between reserves and governance (IFS, ICRG)
RES*L&O Second lag of interaction between reserves and law and order (IFS,
ICRG)
RES*Corruption Second lag of interaction between reserves and corruption (IFS, ICRG)
a. Sources in parentheses.
DL2001: Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).
ICRG: International Country Risk Guide.
IFS: International Financial Statistics.
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